Article / Research Article

Rotterdam, The Netherlands.

Marcel Koeleman,
Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
Submitted :3 December 2025 ; Published :29 December 2025

The good life has technical, ethical, and philosophical connotations. Computer technology in general, and artificial intelligence in particular, makes a technological contribution to that good life, but also has an increasing ethical and philosophical impact. Placed in a philosophical context, the degree to which people have control over the unpredictable largely determines the good life. So say philosophers such as Plato and, more recently, Martha Nussbaum.

This relates to the distinction made in classical Greek philosophy between technē and tuchē. Technē is what we can foresee and oversee, what we can control and influence. Tuchē is the unpredictable to which we as humans are at the mercy of good or bad luck. Philosophers such as Plato and Nussbaum ask: how strong and complete can I make my technē to control tuchē?
The development of computer technology initially offered considerable promise for strengthening that technē, but the power of technology increasingly appears to be such that it becomes more autonomous and generates products that no longer directly stem from the intentions with which humans designed the technology, through algorithms and the like.

AI seems capable of developing its own tuchē, moving us further and further away from the control over tuchē via technē. This also has consequences for the ethical side of the good life: who can take responsibility for the resulting products and outcomes of AI, and the decision making based on that? This contribution examines the possibilities of using human communicative action to verify validity, in order to support making the right choice and taking the right decision.

Habermas’s validity claims may enable us to verify AI, the technē as well as the tuchē, through rational communication. Based on four so-called validity claims, argumentative validity is achieved. The assumption is that this validity then enables the placement of the AI product in question in an ethical-communicative context, through which and with which technē and tuchē can be bridged and potentially connected and by that decision making in and for the Good Life is supported.

One of the results of this contribution is an AI-generated checklist based on Habermas’s validity claims. The question is then if this result can then be tested adequatly against itself and assessed for its validity claims, humanly as well as by AI. That is subject to further research.

In Greek philosophy, technē and tuchē denote, respectively, the control and lack thereof, between what can be controlled by human knowledge and what is determined by chance, luck, and unpredictability. In contemporary computer technology, this distinction is becoming more blurred, and AI now appears to be the result of both rational, predictable algorithms (technē) and unpredictable, non-intentional creations (tuchē). Living the good life requires managing the unpredictable aspects of life (tuchē) effectively, making the right choices and decisions, keeping this as much under control as possible, and linking it to the predictable and controllable aspects (technē), according to Plato and Nussbaum.

This article provides an initial orientation on how communication sciences can additionally gain control over both the tuchē and the technē generated by generative AI.

A leading author in this search for the ‘good’ is the American philosopher Martha Nussbaum (born 1947). According to Martha Nussbaum, the good life implies that both components technē and tuchē are explicitly coupled. Or, put another way: a strong decoupling of them does not contribute to the good life. She has contributed largely and variedly to science, politics, and philosophy in order to ‘formulate a theory for global justice’. A central theme in her work is human vulnerability: “I have always thought of the emotions as recognition of the ways in which we are vulnerable when we relate to others and of everything that out of reach and over which we have no control“. She distinguishes ‘good’ (amongst others love, friendship) and ‘bad’ (amongst others violence, hunger) vulnerabilities for which one needs to have a tool to become aware of them and manage them. That’s what she calls the ‘capabilities approach’. In her normative approach she makes these distinctions explicit: “when nations argue about development and quality of life, they should consider these difficult questions about good at the same time. They cannot simply take for granted that things will get better when their GDP increases. Development means precisely that things are getting better” (Nussbaum, 2011).

In her book The Fragility of Goodness, Nussbaum examines rational self-sufficiency (autarkia) in Greek philosophy as a human condition for protecting the good of a human being and a good life (eudaimonia) by reason against ‘luck’, used by Nussbaum in the meaning of the unforeseen and by that close to the old Greek word ‘tuchē‘.

For the ancient Greek society rationality is a central point in thinking about a good human being. In those days it was a fundamental condition which makes the difference between us and animals and plants, because “We have reason. We are able to deliberate and choose, to make a plan in which ends are ranked, to decide actively what is what to have value and how much value. All this must count for something. If it is true that a lot about us is messy, needy, uncontrolled, rooted in the dirt and standing helplessly in the rain, it is also true that there is something about us that is pure and purely active, something that we could think of as divine, immortal, intelligible, unitary, indissoluble, ever self-consistent and invariable. It seems possible that this rational element in us can rule and guide the rest, thereby saving the whole person from living at the mercy of luck” (Nussbaum, 2001).

The development of the ‘good’ is in itself an ethic learning process, says Nussbaum. This will be worked out by the (development of the) viewpoints of Plato on the essential attitude and habits for living a good life, as observed by Nussbaum. In this, living a good life is taken as an analogy for performing good leadership as it is in both cases basically related to a fundamental human condition. Not a passive one but one that is intrinsically a part of our being and acting as a person and therefore is applicable to life and leadership.

Plato is seen as the first scientific and systematic thinker and philosopher in Western culture whose fundamental Ideas and his Socratic technique are an important reference for observing life until today (Prins, 1992). Here, the analysis of Nussbaum in her work ‘The Fragility of Goodness’ (Nussbaum, 2001) is used as a key to the works of Plato. Especially her observations at the so-called recantation in the works of Plato. The recantation in the viewpoints of Socrates marks the change in the opinion of Plato, starting from his idea that humanity initially was built only from rational and cognitive characteristics of man (Politeia, Protagoras), transforming in a more human characteristic including emotions and non-rationality as equally important factors for good behavior by man (Hippias Major, Ion, Phaedrus).

A similar but slightly different development from a rational man to a human being can be traced down in the works of Michel Foucault, especially in the ‘Hermeneutics of the Subject’ (Foucault, 2005). In this ‘hermeneutics of the subject’ he transfers man from an object to be observed etnographically or psychologically into a subject from which perspective the world is observed and how the world can be explored by navigation and piloting – cybernetics – just for the sake of existence (Foucault, 2005). This existential Care of the Self is an essential add, not to say a kind of super-technē, to man leading themselves, their households and the political community.

Plato postulates in his early works (Phaidon, Politeia, Symposion) empathically that the ethical learning process will take place by separation of intellect from humanly and bodily aspects. The old Greek takes fate and luck as something situational, asking themselves with how much fate and luck a man can live. This pragmatic viewpoint differs from the more recent and widely implemented Kantian viewpoint that moral values are aesthetically independent of fate and luck. In fact this is the contradiction between respectively ‘doing good’ and ‘being good’ including the Aristotelian remark that ‘doing just acts without actually being just is better than not doing them at all’.

In Greek philosophy, the concept of technē is used differently by Plato and Aristotle, among others. While Aristotle approaches it primarily from a practical perspective (knowing how something is constructed; part of the five intellectual virtues epistēmē, technē, phronesis, sophia, nous), Plato uses a more knowledge-based idea (technē as a precursor to the good, where knowledge of that good goal is a prerequisite).

With technē (τέχνη), Plato means skill, knowledge or art. This refers to both the “how” and the “wherefore.” With tuchè (τύχη), Plato means apparent chance, luck, or misfortune that can contribute to the good life but is subordinate to reason and a divine plan (Kraut, 2022).

In the works mentioned earlier Plato’s ‘reason’ has a dominant position in describing the good life which becomes clear in Protagoras as a ‘science of practical reasoning’. However more and more attention is paid in Plato’s works to the passionate relations between people. Phaidon, Politeia and Symposion give emerging space to that aspect of living a good life. Nussbaum criticizes the original rationalistic attitude of ethics of the good life as well for the reason that at the end an ethical content will be perceived by cognition through our emotional reflex to that. It is in fact also a critique that Plato himself formulates in Symposion as living an independent good life, so without interference of the unforeseen, as a human life which is not aesthetic and which does not give the experience of beauty of a good life. In later works, like Phaedrus, Plato criticizes the an-aesthetic vision on the good life as expressed in his early works more explicitly. In other words, for the good life technē as well as tuchē are needed.

Plato notes that an existential activity or task of a human being is to deal with the unforeseen, defined as that part of life that cannot be controlled (tuchē). In order to gain a certain level of control one needs to be crafted to effectively handle the unforeseen. That is knowledge (episteme) and competency, so to say that is the technē. In the context of the decision making process, technē is thus a relevant aspect of effectiveness and performance of a leader. It is featured by universality, teachability, precision and concern with explanation. Nussbaum states: “Technē, then, is a deliberate application of the human intelligence to some part of the world, yielding some control over tuchē; it is concerned with the management of need and with prediction and control concerning future contingencies. The person who lives by technē does not come to each new experience without foresight or resource. He possesses some sort of systematic grasp, some way of ordering the subject matter, that will take him to the new situation well prepared, removed from blind dependence on what happens” (Nussbaum, 2001). Strategical vision and tactical insights are needed.

Nevertheless, in Ion Plato makes clear what is essential for a good performance (in the case of Ion as an artist). Tuchē and technē then seem to be insufficient and an-aesthetic when Sokrates states that something more is happening than just being a good professional (i.c. sufficient technē): “Then that is how we think of you, Ion, the lovelier way: it’s as someone divine, and not as master of a profession, that you are a singer of Homer’s praises” (Plato, Ion, -390/1983). More recently a similar observation is made by French philosopher Michel Foucault with another metaphor: “The philosophical life, rather, or the life as defined and prescribed by philosophers as the life thanks to technē, does not obey a regula (a rule): it submits to a forma (a form). It is a style of life, a sort of form one gives to one’s life. For example, to build a beautiful temple according to the technē of architects, one must of course follow some rules, some indispensable technical rules. But the good architect is one who uses enough of his liberty to give the temple a forma, a beautiful form” (Foucault, 2005).

In Politeia a further development of the idea of ‘the good life’ leads to a somewhat hybrid viewpoint where reason as well as pleasure are incorporated. Pleasure then is seen as a result of reason, argued by Plato by the fact that it has a so-called intrinsic value, which is depicted by pureness, stability and truth. In this application of the absolute Ideas by Plato, pleasure still contributes to his basic principle that a good life is independent of context and circumstances and is by that ascetic by nature. In Phaedo it is still a starting point that life is an exercise in separating the soul from the body, while Politeia is more about an instruction on strategies to “turning the soul around from its natural human way of seeing to the correct way” (Nussbaum, 2001). The same soul, as Nussbaum observes, that is mentioned by Socrates when he talks about the truth of the ‘good’: “This, indeed, is what every soul pursues, and for the sake of this it does everything it does, divining obscurely what it is” (Politeia 505E). Nevertheless Plato’s approach is still ‘reasonable’, yet implicitly aesthetic: “Our psychology has a natural affinity with the truly good. We find mathematics beautiful and exciting because, by good luck, we fit with real beauty” (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 161).

In the Phaedrus this growing attention to experiences and awareness other than just the rationally perceived ones becomes more abundant. ‘Mania’, as a possessed and so not a mere intellectual activity is introduced by Plato as a relevant aspect of living a good life. It is often connoted in the meaning of madness. A clear point opposite that connotation is made by Verhoeven (1967) when he refers to Sokrates in the Phaedrus indicating that “most people keep mania for madness or to be confused (parakinoon), but they are missing the fact that [by Sokrates] it is given by god (enthousiadzoon)” (Verhoeven, 1967). Nussbaum argues that this change is in fact an example of the recantation of Plato by himself expressed in a new view on the importance of feeling, emotion and love in the good life, implying that “sense and emotion are guides towards the good and indices of its presence” (Nussbaum, 2001). It is not ‘reason’ then which is chosen as focal point but the soul of a human being. One expression of the good which is relevant for a relationship perspective in which people are connected in order to achieve a quality of life that is more than the separated parts together. This resonates to the Theory of Communicative Action by Habermas which imply empowerment of communication in general and dialogue and mutual understanding specifically. Instead-off of the so-called strategic action aiming for dominance and manipulation (Habermas 1984).

In a beautiful metaphoric love story Plato describes the ability ‘to let grow the wings of the soul’, as an indication of the presence of beauty and as a step ahead to gain real insight in life. “Receiving the other person’s soul, allowing to melt the hard or impassive parts of him, he feels the sudden release of pent-up liquid within him, which makes of him another flowing, liquid light.[…] So transformed, he begins to have access to insights that are not available within the dry life of the non-lover. He would not have had them if he had remained very similar to the form” (Nussbaum, 2001). For Plato forms have to do with logical and ethical concepts in which he makes a distinction between forms on the common nature of a defined group of individuals and the abstract characteristics “like beauty or equality or greatness” (Rogers, 1935).

Nussbaum furthermore concludes from Plato’s love stories in Symposion and Phaedrus that it is not only a matter of gaining insight but also a matter of personal growth: “Their search for understanding and goodness is accomplished, throughout life, in the context of a particular relationship with an individual whose distinctive character is nourished within it“. However, introducing ‘mania’ in the good life is not without consequences: “The lovers have continually to struggle against inappropriate inclinations, to expend psychic effort in order to hit on what is appropriate” (Nussbaum, 2001). So introducing the non-rational aspects in the concept of life leads by Platonic definition to a good life, which is at the same time more rich as well as a more complex. This is expressed beautifully by Socrates in a prayer to Pan (the mad erotic god, son of Hermes the god of luck) when “asking for a beautiful inside and an outside that will be loved by that inside” (Phaedrus 279B-C, in (Nussbaum, 2001).

So what can be concluded about this deliberation on living the good live as observed by Plato and Nussbaum? It results in what is called ‘sumfutos dunamis‘ in the Phaedrus: a power naturally grown-together, built up by the supportive cooperation of the non-rational aspects, which are needed to reach the destination, which is chosen by our reason.

This is made clear in the scientific works of Antonio Damasio, a Portuguese leading neuroscientist who has criticized largely the viewpoints of Descartes about his ‘misunderstanding’ of the role that feelings and intuition play in people’s life and decision making besides rationality. He introduced the so called ‘somatic marker hypothesis‘ which is a theory about how emotions are involved in decision-making (consciously and non-consciously, positively and negatively). He states that “when emotion is entirely left out of the reasoning picture, as happens in certain neurological conditions, reason turns out to be even more flawed than when emotion plays bad tricks on our decisions” (Damasio, 1994). This makes clear that for a succesful human development a complete approach is required, which means that technē as well as tuchē are involved. This aspect of connectivity (with the Self, with family and friends, with society) is further given depth in the works of John Dewey who has focused on the aesthetic dimension of experience. In his view “experience is a process in nature; it embraces potentialities as well as immediate actualities; it can be civilized or cultivated through education, whereby one becomes a participant in a social world […] it can develop continuously rather than be suffered from moment to moment” (Alexander, 1995).

Why is this philosophical approach relevant and important? It is relevant because it offers insight into how the good life can be constructed, namely from both technē and tuchē. Given the growing importance of AI in society, incorporating these philosophical insights is also important for truth finding through AI.

AI has gradually been adapted to enhance technology and, through generative AT, is evolving into an AI that now also generates its own domain, thus becoming part of the unpredictable aspects of life. This manifests itself in people’s individual lives and requires an increasing degree of technology to manage this new, ever-increasing domain and to ensure sufficient resilience as individuals. The add of technology as a lengthening of our own senses is observed very differently by scholars. Dorresteijn positions technology in the context of Foucault’s cri-de-coeur that mankind needs to re-design one’s own existence again. According to Foucault, people lost this existential competence to early Christianity, art and militant political movement. Technology, according to Dorresteijn, enables people to integrate it with oneself, as a form of re-design (Dorresteijn, 2009). For Roeser this consequence of application of technology, more specifically the development and engineering of it, requires then ethical considerations because it influences the well-being of people. (Roeser, 2010). Scholars like Sloterdijk and Oosterling are pointing clearly on the negative consequences of technology for the individual freedom of man: “Modern life has undergone a ‘silent take-over’: Technology has converted –explicitated – modern man’s soul without his realizing it […] Media are incorporated to the point of becoming indispensable means of subsistence. As a result, our moral categories are transformed” (Oosterling, 2007).

From a contemporary perspective, AI is therefore a contemporary technē because it is an extension of human rationality through its goal-oriented design and traceable knowledge, such as algorithms. Philosophically speaking, AI also leads to contemporary tuchē due to the not entirely predictable results of AI. Machine learning models such as deep neural networks, in particular, increasingly have the property of being able to achieve unexpected and surprising results due to their non-linear and emergent nature (Gal, 2016), while “these machines don’t learn the concepts we are trying to teach them, but rather they learn shortcuts to correct answers on the training set—and such shortcuts will not lead to good generalizations” (Mitchell, 2021). Thus, AI, through tuchē, reaches beyond our human control over the outcome and illustrates the limited extent to which we as humans have control over our lives. This raises questions about the extent to which we can still exercise agency and be responsible for outcomes beyond our control. It is expected that tomorrow’s AI discipline will be introduced as part of Artificial Intuition, as a so-called Fourth Generation AI with true intelligence (synthesis of intellect and intuition). This is in line with development of AI via the First Generation of AI (descriptive analytics), the Second Generation of AI (diagnostic analytics), and the current Third Generation of AI (predictive analytics) (Ritesh, 2023). The technology thus becomes more autonomous and leads to the strengthening and further development of both technē and tuchē.

In summary, technē in the context of AI is characterized, respectively, by design by people with a specific purpose based on systematically collected data and using formal learning methods, working towards control and efficiency. Tuchẽ is characterized by emergent unintended behavior based on random data with a black-box learning character, resulting in a surprising outcome with uncertainty and risk.

Technological systems externalize human knowledge, allowing technē to extend beyond the biological limits of humans and, through its increasing sophistication, become increasingly autonomous. For these two reasons, this ultimately leads to a lack of control by humans. In this way, each technē has its own inaccessibility, its own tuchē, in addition to the aspect of tuchē’s unpredictability. Stiegler calls this the pharmakon characteristic of technology: the black box is both poison and remedy, both technē and tuchē, both connecting and disconnecting, both externalizing and internalizing (Stiegler, 2012).

An autonomy of technology is emerging that influences the man-machine relationship (Heidegger, 1977) and raises a question about the agency of the results and products of that technology: can we as humans still be responsible for them? The original premise of human agency, and thus human responsibility for technology, is drifting (Floridi & Cowls 2022).

As life can be described as a process of managing the unforeseen, how to deal the ‘tuchē’ with ‘technē’, Nussbaum distinguishes three types of managing the tuchē: related to individual aspects of a good life which are extra vulnerable for the unforeseen like love and wealth, related to the harmony or conflict between plural aspects of a good life, and the more internal (from a human point of view) vulnerability related to the so-called ‘irrational parts of the soul’ like feelings and emotions. These parts might lead to “passions [which] can still figure as sources of disruption, disturbing the agent’s rational planning as if from without and producing distortion of judgement, inconstancy or weakness in action” (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 7).

Nussbaum concludes, with Sokrates (356C-E, in: Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 2001, p. 63), that a procedure is needed to be able to make clear and systematic choices in order to achieve the ‘good’. It is therefore needed in her view to be in control in order to be able to deal adequately with constraints and fuzziness of a human’s soul (‘diseases’), or synonymously the tuchē of an AI-system:

The attachment of people to fragile objects and activities resulting in the receptivity for contingency. As an example of domination of tuchē.

The pluriformity of values to be achieved, without a clue on priority or interrelated conflicts. As an example of insufficient technē.

The influence of basic motivators like passion and emotion which undermines the original plan. As an example of incapability of dealing with tuchē by technē.

“The right technē for making choices appears to be the technē which can treat these diseases”, as Nussbaum called them. Technē enables us to overcome the problems with tuchē, as illustrated in the story of Protagoras. “He [Protagoras] has shown us thoroughly [that] the identity and ways of life of a species are formed by the arts and abilities it possesses” (Nussbaum, 2001).

The way it succeeds depends not only on the capacities and capabilities of the technē, but also on the level of reluctancy of people in dealing with the unknown, as illustrated in the story of Protagoras: “Sometimes […] as with the gifts of Zeus, the art will so deeply transform ways of life that we will feel that it has created a new type of creature. If, then, we contemplate curing our current ethical diseases by a new art, we must imagine […] the life that we will live with this new art and the aims and ends that go with it. For we may not want a radical solution, if its cost will be to be no longer human. This would hardly count as saving our lives” (Nussbaum, 2001).

The decision-making process uses insights from knowledge, the technē, in a context of unpredictability, the tuchē. It becomes confusing when AI is incorporated with the assumption that this will enhance knowledge. After all, generative AI, among other things, also appears to contribute to unpredictability. From the perspective of Nussbaum’s “achieving the good life,” in which technē and tuchē are connected as much as possible, the conclusion here is that due to the increase in both technē and tuchē through the use of AI, additional effort is needed to adequately connect tuchē and technē. In this paper, I propose that this connection can be established through communication. More precisely, through the application of Jürgen Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action. Based on his so-called validity claims, individuals can be enabled to test the veracity of AI products. As a form of new application of existing communication skills, enabling informed, rational decisions about AI products.

A balanced set of rational and non-rational “considerations,” technē and tuchē, thus leads to a form of “the good” or “the beautiful.” Habermas indicated that in addition to cognitive-instrumental rationality (or Strategic Action), communicative rationality (or Communicative Action) is also necessary. In this case, comprehensibility, truth, correctness, and veracity are essential for the ability of individuals to understand the truth of statements within a society and the correctness of the norms that society adheres to, or to question these norms and verify their validity. He developed his theory of human-human communication, but its characteristics and competencies are useful in assessing human-machine interactions, such as in AI.

Habermas’ validity claims are anchored in his Theory of Communicative Action. This theory implies the empowerment of communication in general, and dialogue and mutual understanding in particular. This could be a response to the so-called strategic action aimed at dominance and manipulation (Habermas, 1984; Habermas, 1990), which is increasingly being carried out by technological systems such as AI. Habermas warns against the “colonization of the lifeworld,” as he calls it, while systems like AI mediate information, decision-making, social structures, the workplace, and culture, which are directly targeted at individuals by highly individualized systems such as smartphones. Habermas’s validity claims strengthen understanding and autonomy as a contribution to individual resilience by evaluating AI products for their truth, rightness, sincerity, and comprehensibility (Habermas, 1984; Habermas, 1985; Habermas, 1990; Finlayson & Rees, 2023).

In the context of AI ethics, individual resilience refers to a person’s capacity to remain autonomous and critical in a world increasingly shaped by algorithmic systems. AI can contribute to, but simultaneously requires, among other things, structuring and strengthening critical thinking, enhancing decision-making and moral choices, and media literacy. This results in resilient humans who remain autonomous in this tech world by being critical and acting ethically. This resilience goes beyond mere technical competence; it requires the ability to critically question and interpret AI systems and products (Floridi, 2019; Bryson & Theodorou, 2019).

Strengthening and supporting individual resilience through Habermas’ validity claims enables us to enforce individual resilience while being approached by AI as an individual. There is no collective shield. While it is questionable whether individuals are still agents of their own choices and decisions, they are enabled by Habermas’ validity claims to regain some of the autonomy that has been transferred to tech machines.

The ‘diseases’ mentioned by Nussbaum point to a poorly balanced setting. A procedure is needed to overcome this, as Nussbaum argued. In this article, the procedure, or “treatment,” is approached by applying this Theory of Communicative Action. In the context of this article, Habermas has, in fact, developed rational instruments (technē) to evaluate unpredictable, unverifiable, AI-generated information and products (tuchē), thus obtaining the “good” as an expression of a desired truth.

In his theory, Habermas carried this communicative rationality through on the basis of four validity claims:

1. The truth of what is asserted (‘truth’): Is what this system says factually correct?
2. The correctness of what is said (‘rightness’): Is this morally responsible or socially appropriate?
3. The truthfulness of the intention (‘sincerity’): Is this system transparent and honest about what it does or intends?
4. The comprehensibility of what is said (‘clarity’): Is it formulated in a way that is understandable to the user?

One of the results of this contribution is an AI-generated checklist based on Habermas’s validity claims, see table 1. This result can then be tested against itself and assessed for its validity claims. These validity checks can then be used as an assessment framework for AI systems based on Habermas’s ethical-communicative approach:

Table 1: Checklist AI-products with Habermas’ Validity Claims (table generated by chatGTP)

Enabled by Habermas’ validity claims, the use of communicative action contributes to the connection between technē and tuchē through its communicative nature. This contributes by that to the Good Life, philosophical speaking.

Skill in applying validity claims is a human capacity that is individually applicable and thus contributes to resilience at the individual level, the scale at which people are addressed by that technology in general and by artificial intelligence in particular.

Based on this brief overview, it is plausible that deploying this human capacity on AI products is practically feasible and effective. It is also plausible that this human capacity can be partially operationalized with and by AI. AI products such as the AI-generated table in this article can then be tested against themselves. In principle, this can also be left to AI in the capacity of an IF (Intelligent Firewall). The extent to which this is actually possible and which tuchē should be taken into account is the subject of further research.

The author gratefully acknowledge the valuable insights and feedback provided by Prof. dr. D. Brandt (formerly affiliatend with RWTH Aachen University, Germany) and Dr. H. Oosterling (formerly affiliated with Erasmus University Rotterdam, Netherlands).

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